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The Jurisprudence of the                                       
Military-Industrial Complex 
Ann Scales 
Laura Spitz1 
 
This is the text of a joint lecture delivered at Seattle University on 
February 27, 2003, sponsored by the Wismer Center.  Given the timing and 
subject matter of the talk, it is necessarily a snapshot of a particular 
moment in history, touching on events that will undoubtedly have developed 
further by the time of publication—for example, the “official war” against 
Iraq will have started and maybe ended.  At the presentation, we took a 
“tag-team” approach, each talking twice in turn, and we have maintained 
that format for this publication.   
ANN SCALES: 
I have long complained—including in a speech at the law school of this 
university some years ago—about how legal education typically starts in on 
Day One telling law students how little, really, law can accomplish in the 
world.2  Even when I was in law school, that message was terribly 
disempowering.  But today the disempowerment is huge.  Law and lawyers 
seem unable to do anything about the systematic disempowerment of law 
itself in the name of law, such as in the USA Patriot Act,3 the Homeland 
Security Act,4 or the soon expected Patriot Act II.   
Today, though, Laura and I are not going to rehash the specifics of that 
legislation or any U.N. resolutions.  Instead, we are going to talk more 
broadly, about the relationship between the rule of law and the military-
industrial complex.  
What is “the rule of law”?  The phrase represents a deeply held value that 
provokes little agreement.5  I suspect that even the most contentious 
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jurisprudes, however, would concede two things.  First, for a system to 
count as a genuinely democratic rule of law, the rules have to apply to 
everybody.  Second, there has to be a detached adjudicative process; 
decisions about the rules cannot be delegated to the very people the law is 
there to protect us against.    
And what is “the military-industrial complex”?  The term was introduced 
into the political vernacular by President Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell 
speech.  Eisenhower described how World War II and the Cold War had 
compelled the United States, for the first time, to commit to a large standing 
army and a permanent armaments industry.  These developments, 
Eisenhower thought, had the gravest implications for democracy and 
survival.  Keeping in mind his brilliant military career, recall the most 
famous sentence of Eisenhower’s farewell address: “[W]e must guard 
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or 
unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”6 
So, what is the jurisprudence of the military-industrial complex?  The 
short answer is this: the military-industrial complex has arrived at a comfy 
situation where it is either exempt from the rule of law, or else gets to make 
every decision that informs what the rule of law would require in a given 
situation.  It is kind of like having your cake and eating it with the Lord.  
Eisenhower could have no idea how huge, seamless, and synergistic this 
complex would become, including not just weapons manufacture, but 
virtually all relations of law, production, and populations in the world.  I am 
going to take a couple of minutes to spell out how the military side of this 
complex presently works, erasing boundaries with industrial interests, and 
indeed, with any other legally recognized interests at all. 
First, our nation’s history and legitimacy rest upon a separation of 
military power from democratic governance.  For that reason, the armed 
forces are subject to constitutional constraint. 
Second, however, as an aspect of separation of powers, courts try not to 
interfere in areas of foreign policy and military affairs.  Often this is 
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referred to as the “political question” doctrine, a determination that a matter 
is beyond the capabilities of judges.  The strongest argument for this 
deference is that the political branches—or the military itself—have 
superior expertise in military matters.  That may be true in some situations.  
I am not sure, for example, the Supreme Court would have been the best 
crowd to organize the invasion of Normandy.  But what we now have is an 
increasingly irrational deference.7  Consider three cases:  
a.  In Korematsu v. United States,8 the Supreme Court said the internment   
of Japanese-Americans at the beginning of 1942 was constitutional, 
based upon a military assessment of the possibility of espionage in 
preparation for a Japanese invasion of the United States.  It turns out 
that the information provided by the military to the Supreme Court 
was falsified.9  But note two things: (1) the nation was in the midst of 
a declared world war, and (2) in subsequent less urgent 
circumstances, Korematsu would seem to argue strongly for military 
justifications to have to be based upon better, more reliable 
information than was offered there. 
b.  In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg,10 the Supreme Court decided 
that it was constitutional for Congress to exclude women from the 
peacetime registration of potential draftees, even though both the 
Department of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff had testified that 
including women would increase military readiness.  But Congress 
got the benefit of the military deference doctrine as a cover for what I 
think was a sinister political purpose—to protect the manliness of 
war—and the Supreme Court felt perfectly free to ignore what those 
with the real expertise had to say. 
c.  Most recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Fourth Circuit held that a 
U.S. citizen who had been designated an “enemy combatant”12 could 
be detained indefinitely without access to counsel.  In this case, 
however, not only is there no declared war,13 but also, the only 
evidence regarding Mr. Hamdi was a two-page affidavit by a Defense 
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Department underling, Mr. Mobbs.  Mobbs stated that Mr. Hamdi was 
captured in Afghanistan, and had been affiliated with a Taliban 
military unit.  The government would not disclose the criteria for the 
“enemy combatant” designation, the statements of Mr. Hamdi that 
allegedly satisfied those criteria, nor any other bases for the 
conclusion of Taliban “affiliation.”14  And that is as good as the 
evidence for life imprisonment without trial has to be.  Deference to 
the military has become abdication.  
In other words, what we presently have is not civilian government under 
military control, but something potentially worse, a civilian government 
ignoring military advice,15 but using the legal doctrine of military deference 
for its own imperialist ends.   
Third, the gigantic military establishment and permanent arms industry 
are now in the business of justifying their continued existences. This 
justification is done primarily, as you know, by retooling for post-Cold War 
enemies—the so-called “rogue states”—while at the same time creating 
new ones, for example by arming corrupt regimes in Southeast Asia.16  I 
was reminded of this recently when we went to see comedian Kate Clinton.  
She thought Secretary Powell had taken too much trouble in his 
presentation attempting to convince the Security Council that Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction.17  Why not, she asked, “just show them the 
receipts?” 
Fourth, we have seen the exercise of extraordinary influence by arms 
makers on both domestic and foreign policy.  For domestic pork barrel and 
campaign finance reasons, obsolete or unproven weapons systems continue 
to be funded even when the military does not want them!18  And, just when 
we thought we had survived the nuclear arms race nightmare, the United 
States has undertaken to design new kinds of nuclear weapons,19 even when 
those designs have little military value.20  Overseas, limitations on arms 
sales are being repealed, and arms markets that should not exist are being 
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constantly expanded21 for the sake of dumping inventory, even if those 
weapons are eventually used for “rogue” purposes by rogue states.   
This system skews security considerations, and militarizes foreign policy. 
Force has to be the preferred option because other conduits of policy are not 
sufficiently well-funded.  Plus, those stockpiled weapons have got to be 
used or sold so that we can build more.   
Fifth, enlarging upon this in a document entitled The National Security 
Policy of the United States, we were treated last September to “the Bush 
doctrine,” which for the first time in U.S. history declares a preemptive 
strike policy.  This document states, “America will act against emerging 
threats before they are fully formed.”22  If they are only emerging and not 
fully formed, you may wonder, how will we know they are “threats”?  
Because someone in Washington has that perception, and when the hunch 
hits, it is the official policy of this country to deploy the military.23  All 
options—including the use of nuclear weapons—are always on the table. 
Finally, there go the fundamental constitutional distinctions on which the 
republic’s legitimacy relies.  Orwell’s satire seems too mild.  In his 1984, 
the slogan was, “War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is 
Strength.”24  In this real 2003 world, there are no meaningful distinctions 
between wartime and peacetime, between war front and home front, 
between combatant and non-combatant, or between emergency defensive 
needs and foreign policy generally. We are slaves of fear. Fear makes us 
give away our freedoms and embrace ignorance as a precondition of 
continued existence. 
But in whose interests?  Isn’t it possible that this state of “permanent 
crisis” is just a means to keep us on board?  That blaring nationalism is just 
a distraction, while corporate interests control everything including this 
fearful consciousness?  Remember, we are supposed to be shopping for 
America! 
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LAURA SPITZ:  
I am going to talk about the connections among business interests and 
military interests, focusing on the business or industrial aspects of the 
military-industrial complex. As a paradigm of the military-industrial link, 25 
think of Mr. Rumsfeld’s recent criticisms of the draft during the Vietnam 
War.  The draft was a bad idea, he said, because many men had to work for 
the U.S. government at less than their market value.26  In this statement—
which he later regretted—Mr. Rumsfeld let reality get loose: what matters 
in the Administration’s decisions is what the market wants to matter, and 
who loses are the people the market would willingly let lose.   
Also paradigmatic of the link between business and the military is the 
Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy, which, as Ann said, was 
published in September 2002.  In that document, the Administration tries to 
make the case for the critical importance of global free enterprise to our 
national security by simply making the statement that this is so: “Free 
markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy.”27  
According to the White House, in making these claims America has both 
morality and history on its side.  In fact, the published documents state, “the 
concept of free trade arose as a moral principle even before it became a 
pillar of economics,”28 and, “the lessons of history are clear,”29 the lesson 
being that this Administration’s version of a free market economy is the 
best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.  
In this new vision for national security, lower tax rates in foreign 
countries are a priority,30 apparently key to our safety.  Why is it a National 
Security strategy of the United States that foreign countries have lower 
marginal tax rates?  First, apparently this infusion of capital will provide an 
incentive for people to work in those countries31 (as if the reason they are 
presently poor and unemployed is a lack of motivation).  Second, poverty 
and destitution are underlying conditions that terrorists can exploit;32 
therefore, U.S. foreign policies and strategies should be aimed at 
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diminishing those underlying conditions,33 and lower tax rates are an 
effective strategy for that purpose.   
This last justification—a concern for underlying conditions—seems 
disingenuous, particularly as (1) there is no meaningful consideration of 
other ways that the U.S. might assist in the diminishment of poverty and 
destitution, and (2) the White House has also stated that terrorist cells are 
established in very open, liberal, and tolerant societies, like the U.S. and 
other market-based economies.34   
It would seem that the real connection among lower foreign tax rates, free 
trade, and National Security has to do with the legitimation of rampant 
greed by invocation of patriotism and fear.  Lower taxes mean more money 
for entities with enough capital to invest in foreign countries, such as a 
future Iraq with a denationalized oil industry.  And in order to insulate its 
foreign economic agenda from review and meaningful criticism, the White 
House needs to posit its economic foreign policy as a National Security 
issue.  That way, to criticize the statement that the White House’s global 
economic vision is the “single sustainable economic model”35 is to be a 
traitor.  Economic global power becomes a sovereign imperative, 
legitimately backed by military force.  And as Ann told us, when the White 
House is making “military” decisions, we can rely on American courts to 
defer to those decisions. 
This is a relatively cozy place to be, a place where the civilian population 
has no business questioning foreign economic policy or the wedding of 
military, industry, and national destiny.  Add to this the fact of the 
Administration’s claim that free trade is actually a moral imperative, that as 
a matter of National Security the United States will enforce trade 
agreements, and the Administration has no difficulty breaching other 
treaties and U.N. resolutions,36 and one can see that its place is not only 
cozy, but also lawless.   
Though I am not a strong supporter of President Bush, and I would like to 
blame him for this, he is not the architect of the pro-business elision of 
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national and international interests.  One of the best examples predating 
him, of course, is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
substance of which is astonishing to the uninitiated.37   
How does it work?  Whole books and courses are devoted to the subject, 
but I want to make four points for our purposes here.  First, while domestic 
business is ostensibly constrained by existing domestic laws,38 multinational 
enterprises are not easily subjected to national policy in an increasingly 
globalized economy.  That problem is hugely exacerbated by NAFTA, 
because even when domestic law may be potentially enforceable, Canada, 
the United States, and Mexico are required by NAFTA to enact and 
interpret domestic laws in the “least trade restrictive” manner.39  
Second, Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides that private investors may 
directly sue national governments to enforce NAFTA obligations and to 
recover damages, including pure economic loss.  This is an incredibly 
powerful and unusual grant of legal standing to non-parties, since NAFTA 
is actually a contract between nations.40 
Third, this Administration has made it a part of its National Security 
Strategy to enforce trade agreements.41  Presumably, the United States will 
not invade Canada to enforce NAFTA,42 but the coupling of this 
commitment with the threat of military force is obviously meant to provoke 
fear. 
Finally, taken in combination—the restraint on domestic governments 
from enacting or enforcing laws inconsistent with NAFTA obligations, the 
grant of standing to investors to sue for lost profits, and the underlying 
threat of force—the situation operates so that NAFTA actually acts as an 
insurance policy for corporations doing business among the member states.  
In many cases domestic legal restraints have become largely symbolic, 
while taxpayers subsidize and guarantee corporate income levels. 
For example, in 1997, Canada banned the importation and transport of 
MMT,43 a gasoline additive and dangerous neurotoxin already banned by 
the United States.  The U.S. producer had enjoyed steady sales to Canadian 
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companies before the ban.  Less than a week after the ban was passed, that 
producer filed a claim under NAFTA against Canada for $250 million in 
damages.  Canada settled the case by repealing its ban on MMT, paying $13 
million in damages to the producer and issuing a public statement that 
MMT poses no health risk.44   
I want to turn at this point to the domestic protection of business interests 
in the U.S. (which unsurprisingly fits perfectly with U.S. global economic 
and military strategies).  In the last two decades, we have seen 
unprecedented deregulation and privatization in the U.S. (and Canada and 
Mexico).  This has been coupled with putting business beyond interrogation 
by law, much like the military.  Where the law does not operate to 
businesses’ advantage, doctrines have been arranged to exempt them from 
the application of domestic law altogether, so that business drives 
interpretation and development of jurisprudence in many areas of law. 
There are so many examples I cannot possibly list them.  You 
undoubtedly have encountered many.  In sex discrimination employment 
law, for example, we have the “business necessity” and “bona fide 
occupational qualification” defenses, those masterpieces of majoritarianism 
that have made it safe for Hooters to serve breasts for lunch.45  In the airline 
industry, we have seen deregulation, union-busting, and unprecedented 
government bailouts.  Today, I would like to mention just two other 
instances, both of which will be familiar to you—tort reform and Enron. 
In the last 25 years, tort ‘reform’ has been astonishing both in substance 
and momentum.46  In public discourse, it is now taken for granted that all 
manner of tort restriction efforts make sense, including all kinds of damages 
caps,47 litigation hurdles, and immunities.48  This acceptability is the 
triumph of Law and Economics theorists, who have pursued a relentless 
public relations and public policy campaign to limit the reach of tort law in 
the service of business interests.  One way in which they have done this is 
to cast—some have said “create”—an insurance crisis49 as the result of 
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greedy trial lawyers and out-of-control juries,50 rather than as the effects of 
for-profit insurance schemes (or the number of tortfeasors).  
However, the Law and Economics view of tort law and tort reforms is not 
“natural” or “inevitable” but simply well-funded51 and well-advertised.52  
One such funder is the John M. Olin Foundation, which contributed over 
$17 million to law schools in 1999 alone53 (including $6 million to Harvard, 
$1.25 million to Stanford, $2.5 million to Chicago, and $2 million to 
Yale54).  The foundation funds chairs to be filled with like-minded Law and 
Economics proponents who will teach students, who will go on to be 
lawyers and teachers and judges, who will theorize cases and interpret the 
law and teach more students.  The foundation also funds conferences in 
which the judiciary is invited to participate.55  It is no accident that the bulk 
of this money is directed to the “big” schools, from which the “important” 
policy-makers, future law teachers, and judges come.  Nice work if you can 
get it.  
With respect to Enron, I do not propose to rehash recent corporate 
scandals.  I simply want to emphasize the point that most of what these 
companies did was lawful.  It is an almost perfect example of what happens 
when decisions are put in the hands of the people from whom the rules were 
meant to protect us.56  And meanwhile, the man who used to run Enron’s 
corrupt energy trading division is not only not in trouble, he is the Secretary 
of the Army.  And that, incredibly, makes him the man in charge of the 
Army budget.57 
ANN SCALES: 
What shall we do with this state of affairs?  Are we willing to accept that 
“globalization”—as defined by free marketeers—is a law of nature, like 
gravity?  On the military side of things, are we willing to accept that 
warfare has so fundamentally changed that no rules apply?  Shall we 
concede that the Critical Legal Scholars were right in the first place: that the 
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“Rule of Law” was always just a big hoax, a veneer of legitimacy over the 
exercise of raw power? 
We would rather encourage the viewpoint that this state of affairs is a 
fabulous learning opportunity, and maybe even a watershed moment for the 
U.S. Constitution.  Maybe this is a chance to change all that disempowering 
orthodoxy about how the law really cannot do much. 
One thing lawyers can do, as lawyers have always done, is to keep calling 
upon the courts to step up to the Constitutional plate.  But will the courts do 
it this time?  A case filed in Boston asking the court to declare the pending 
invasion of Iraq unconstitutional was dismissed recently as a “political 
question.”58  That didn’t take long, but I will bet the judicial struggle is just 
heating up. 59 
During the Vietnam era, the United States Supreme Court had more than 
two dozen opportunities to rule on the constitutionality of the conflict.60  
Instead of doing so, the Court routinely denied review where lower courts 
had refused to rule on grounds of foreign policy and military deference, 
typically because the Vietnam War presented a so-called “political 
question.”61  As I have said before, this hands-off approach is based on 
judges’ declarations of their own ignorance and incompetence.  
Specifically, the political question doctrine is based upon six factors the 
United States Supreme Court explicated in 1962.  The Court stated that 
judges should refrain from making a decision where there can be said to be: 
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.62   
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A thousand law review articles deconstruct these six factors, and I am not 
going to do so, nor even take time to show how absolutely circular the 
doctrine is here.  Rather, I am going to translate those factors to show how 
they can be understood as a declaration of existential angst and means of 
self-anesthesia in an age of imminent war. 
So, you might hear a judge quote from the six-factor “political question” 
test: “I’m not going to decide this case challenging the constitutionality of 
war in Iraq because it is ‘textually committed to another branch of 
government,’ and there are no ‘judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards’ for deciding it.”  When he says that, you might hear him really 
saying to himself: This is freaking me out.  There is so much information 
flying around and somebody is obviously lying.  But World War III can’t 
really happen, can it?  I need to go to chambers and take a Valium. 
Or, when a judge says, “I’m not going to decide this case because there is 
a need for ‘unquestioning adherence to decisions already made,’ and I have 
to ‘show respect for co-ordinate branches,’” you can hear the judge really 
saying to himself: Please do not let this have anything to do with me.  I will 
never make it to the Court of Appeals if I’m the one who blows the whistle 
on these maniacs.   
Or, finally, when a judge says, “I’m not going to decide this case because 
‘there is a potential for embarrassment to the government,’” perhaps he’s 
really saying: Well, duh. There is a lot of potential embarrassment for me, 
too, especially if the President doesn’t obey my decision. 
Indeed, in the political question and war powers literature, there is a great 
deal of concern about enforcement of a judicial order respecting foreign 
policy or military affairs.63  There is much to discuss here, including the 
scope of any remedy ordered.  In any case, contrary to the apocryphal story 
about President Andrew Jackson,64 no executive yet has refused to comply 
with an order of the Supreme Court.65  Moreover, as that Court stated in 
1969,66 possible noncompliance with an order is not a reason for the 
judiciary to abandon its unique obligation.    
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And maybe that is the meaning of “the rule of law.” 
I want to be part of a legal system where a judge can look at a challenge 
to war mongering and say to himself, to the parties, and to the world: It is 
my duty to decide this case.  I can do so with as much confidence as I have 
in any other case where fact-finding is difficult.  I will uphold my oath of 
office and I expect the President to uphold his.  If the executive branch is 
acting unconstitutionally, I must order it to desist.  That will not be a 
constitutional crisis.  Crisis results when the law is routinely ignored and 
when that is ratified by judicial silence.  The problem is not that I will act, 
but what inaction might allow to happen.  I am entrusted to work with these 
litigants to make legal sense of this crazy world.67   
LAURA SPITZ: 
A judge would have to be equally courageous to resist deferring to the 
interests of big business, as those interests are presently cast.  But here is 
some good news.  One day, you will be those judges (and those teachers) 
(and those lawyers) (and those business people).  So we want to end this 
lecture in what is a hopeful and helpful way, and talk about how we can 
organize our thoughts and approach our world.  We’ve made a list! 
1. Enter the interpretive debate.  Keep in mind the great lesson of Legal 
Realism and the critical legal studies movements of the late 20th 
century, that representations of social life in rational disciplines such as 
law or economics are actually contingent and political interpretations.68  
This is a hopeful lesson.  It means that we can be part of the 
interpretive debate.  We can be part of creating meanings and making 
changes.   
 So for example, when Mr. Bush, or you, or I, or Judge Posner, or 
any number of other people, say “market economy” or “free trade” or 
“globalization” or “just war” or “terrorism,” we do not necessarily 
mean the same things.  It may be true that market economies are the 
best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty, and I have many 
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progressive friends who believe that this is so, but what proponents of 
this particular version of free-market capitalism (or this particular 
version of war) have done is to slowly drag what should be a vigorous 
popular debate about those issues onto a stagnant and univocal plane.  
What we must do in response is explore various meanings of terms—
whether the term is “global trade” or “the rule of law”—and provide 
the arguments for why society should understand them in a more 
complex and more helpful way. 
2. Trust your skills.  “They” (the drafters of the National Security 
Strategy, the Law and Economics theorists, the military leaders, the 
business leaders) are just people, like you and me.  Mr. Bush’s lawyers 
went to law school and graduated and are making arguments before 
courts all over this country about his National Security Strategy and the 
scope, meaning, and constitutionality of legislation like the Patriot Act 
or the Homeland Security Act.  Trust your skills and yourself to be part 
of the process.  They are not right just because they are on his side.   
3. Understand that the Social does not have to be adjunct to the Economic 
(or the Military).  In political and legal history, only recently has the 
Market played such a large and seemingly inevitable and restrictive 
role in how we think about social rights.69  It is even more recent that 
anyone in the law business claimed to know what economics is, or what 
economics necessarily means or demands in a given case.   But it is 
actually and obviously people who decide the interrelationships among 
law, politics, and economics.  This Administration, as part of its 
National Security Strategy, has said that as a matter of foreign policy it 
is necessary to the American vision of the world that other countries 
must accept this Administration’s version of free-market capitalism as 
“the single sustainable model” for economics and politics.70  In its 
“negotiations” for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the U.S.  
has consistently presented its vision (including lower marginal tax 
rates) as nonnegotiable.  It will not sign a trade agreement without an 
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agreement for lower tax rates and other economic imperatives.  But 
those connections and lines are drawn as a matter of policy, not nature.  
Why not instead:  we are unable and unwilling to negotiate a free trade 
agreement in the absence of some agreement about social and political 
rights, including anti-discrimination rules and environmental 
protection? 
4. We need to be suspicious of:  
(a) This Administration’s post-Reagan version of free-market 
capitalism (as if there were not other versions of capitalism); 
(b) The notion that human rights are inconsistent with business 
interests; 
(c) The market as a measure for how well we are doing as a society;71 
(d) Anyone making a claim to neutrality, reason, or inevitability; 
(e) Deference claims: When courts or government defer to the expertise 
of corporations or militarism, they are granting “epistemological 
privilege”72 to those interests, to both define questions and answer 
them; and  
(f) The oversimplification and classification of issues, particularly 
when they are used to close conversations.  I have read that 
“NAFTA is not an employment issue.”  Isn’t that rather like 
saying: “Beautiful breasts are a bona fide occupational 
qualification?”  As a matter of fact, issues are complex and multi-
dimensional.  Resist attempts to essentialize them in ways that 
serve one interest over all others. 
5. Use your imagination.  You have and will continue to acquire the 
skills and interests necessary to be innovative.  Corporations 
encourage imagination, but they do not have a monopoly on it.  
General Electric—the company who manufactured half of all the 
fighter engines used in the first Gulf War,73 and then conveniently 
had contracts to assist in the rebuilding of Kuwait when Desert 
Storm ended74—has a corporate slogan: “What if imagination 
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became reality?”75  When I read that, I think: “Exactly.  What if, 
indeed?” 
                                                 
1 Our thanks to Professor Kellye Testy for giving us the opportunity to speak at Seattle 
University and for her unfailing commitment to social justice.  Thank you also to the 
faculty and audience at Seattle University for their support and comments.  One member 
of the audience in particular—Oakley Ramprashad—gave us love and inspiration. 
2 That lecture is published as Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An 
Outsider’s Guide, 15 VT. L. REV. 139 (1990).  
3 USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
18 U.S.C. § 1). 
4 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) 
(codified as 6 U.S.C. § 101). 
5 There’s no right place to begin in the vast “rule of law” literature, but the Hart/Fuller 
debate, centering as it does on how a legal system might best resist a militarized 
juggernaut, has particular relevance now.  See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation 
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).  Three recent developments have sparked a 
resurgence in rule of law thinking: first, capital’s need for “emerging markets” to provide 
superstructural means for contract enforcement; see Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law 
Revival, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Mar./Apr. 1998); second, the impeachment of President 
Clinton; see Jessie Allen, Blind Faith and Reasonable Doubts: Investigating Belief in the 
Rule of Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 12 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 691 (2001); and, third, 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).  
Among our favorite commentaries on the last topic are Kim Lane Scheppele, When the 
Law Doesn’t Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1361 (2001); and Robin West, Reconstructing the Rule of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 215 
(2001). 
6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Speech (Jan. 17, 1961), at http://www.eisenhower. 
utexas.edu/farewell.htm. 
7 Professor Diane Mazur has shown how, in his long tenure on the Court, Justice 
Rehnquist has almost single-handedly elevated the doctrine of military deference, which 
once required a showing of an actual nexus between a challenged policy and military 
readiness, into a blind abdication to militaristic will.  See Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist’s 
Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 
701 (2002). 
8 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1944). 
9 An army historian later discovered that the military knew there was no threat of 
invasion and had knowingly misinformed the Supreme Court.  For a full account, see 
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
10 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
11 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the judiciary will 
not question governmental allegations that U.S. citizen is an enemy combatant). 
12 Another U.S. citizen, Jose Padilla, was seized at O’Hare Airport for alleged 
participation in a plot to detonate a radioactive bomb.  He is being held indefinitely as an 
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enemy combatant.  A federal district court judge in New York had previously granted 
him access to counsel, in order to assist him in responding to “gossamer speculation” 
about the danger he presents, as alleged in declarations by—you guessed it—Mr. Mobbs.  
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 603–4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The 
Justice Department has asked for reconsideration of that ruling on the basis that allowing 
counsel “would threaten permanently to undermine the military’s efforts to develop a 
relationship of trust and dependency that is essential to effective interrogation.”  The 
government also claims that interrogations of detained persons had “helped to thwart an 
estimated 100 or more attacks against the United States and its interests since Sept. 11, 
2001.” Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Asks Judge to Deny Terror Suspect Access to Lawyer, 
Saying it Could Harm Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A11.  For an up to 
date synopsis of legal events since the beginning of the “War on Terrorism,” see 
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties 
Since September 11, at http://www.lchr.org/us_law/loss/loss_main.htm. 
13 At least there was no war in a conventional, historical sense of a temporally discrete 
military response to a national sovereign.  In response to the attacks of September 11, 
2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  According to this enactment, the President may “use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored 
such organizations or persons.” Id. at 224 (emphasis added).  The courts have not ruled 
on whether such a boundless delegation to the President can constitute a Congressional 
declaration of war within the meaning of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. . 
14 The holes in the government’s showing are described in detail in the Distict Court’s 
opinion.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d 316 F.3d 450 
(4th Cir. 2003).  As District Judge Doumar stated, “[t]he Mobbs declaration is little more 
than the government’s ‘say-so’ regarding the validity of Hamdi’s classification as an 
enemy combatant.”  Id. at 535. 
15 Nicholas D. Kristof, War and Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A25 (noting 
concern of Generals Norman Schwarzkopf, Anthony Zinni, and Wesley Clark); Doug 
Thompson, Role Reversals: Bush Wants War, Pentagon Urges Caution, CAPITOL HILL 
BLUE, Jan. 22, 2003, available at http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/ 
article_1587.shtml. 
16 Thus, the Pentagon has already restored military advantages to Indonesia, though 
Congress had cut-off military assistance after the East Timor massacres only in 1999.  
Military-to-military aid hugely overshadows civilian aid in the Philippines and in 
Thailand, as well as in Indonesia.  See Joshua Kurlantzick, Stop Arming Southeast Asia, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 2003 at 16. 
17 On February 5, 2003, United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell gave an 
elaborate speech to the United Nations Security Council, replete with charts and a slide 
show of grainy aerial photographs.  See Secretary Colin L. Powell, Remarks at the United 
Nations Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), at www.state.gov/secretary/m/2003/17300.htm. 
18 Leslie Wayne, So Much for the Plan to Scrap Old Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2002, § 3 at 1 (focusing on $64 billion re-funding of F/A-22 fighter jet, designed to 
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engage Soviet planes never produced, and $46 billion V-22 Osprey helijet, despite killing 
Marines in testing and a decade-long tardiness in development). 
19 Julian Borger, U.S. Plan for New Nuclear Arsenal, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 19, 
2003, at 1.  CIA Director Tenet has recently predicted a new worldwide nuclear arms 
race, a prediction that has the triple effect of buttressing the preemptive strike doctrine, 
bolstering the much-ridiculed “Star Wars” missile defense plan, and laying the 
groundwork for abrogation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  See also 
Walter Pincus, CIA Head Predicts Nuclear Race, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2003, at A01; 
Paul Richter, The World Showdoen with Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, at 1; Edward M. 
Kennedy, Our Nuclear Talk Gravely Imperils U.S., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at 13. 
20 The present administration has been looking since early 2001 for a military use for 
tactical nuclear weapons now being touted as “bunker-busters.”  However, to reach 
underground bunkers, such a bomb would have to be detonated at or below the earth’s 
surface, causing damage far in excess of that inflicted at Hiroshima.  See Michael Levi, 
Fallout, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 2003. 
21 Within the last decade, arms manufacturers have systematically gotten Congress to 
remove restrictions on arms sales to countries with poor human rights records, or 
countries otherwise previously deemed too dangerous to have such arms.  See William D. 
Hartung, Military-Industrial Complex Revisited: How Weapons Makers Are Shaping U.S. 
Foreign and Military Policies, (June 8, 1999), at http://www.fpif.org/papers/micr/ 
index.html. In 2000 alone, defense contractors gave $6.5 million in campaign 
contributions, and spent $60 million on lobbying. Michelle Ciarrocca, Post-9/11 
Economic Windfalls for Arms Manufacturers, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Sept. 2002), at 
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol7/v7n10arms_body.html.  Sales to foreign governments are 
so crucial to the system that U.S. arms makers pay huge “offsets”—legal bribes—to close 
deals.  Leslie Wayne, A Well-Kept Military Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 3 at 1. 
22 GEORGE W. BUSH, WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (SEPT. 17, 2002), at vii [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
23 The New York Times calls this abandonment of the doctrine of containment for a 
policy of preemption  “the most salient evolution of American foreign policy since the 
end of the cold war.”  Todd S. Purdum, The Brains Behind Bush’s War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2003, at 6. 
24 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 1990) (1949). 
25 Another obvious example of this link is the connections among Halliburton, Vice-
President Cheney, the Californian energy “crisis,” and U.S. government contracts.  Mr. 
Cheney was the Secretary of Defense March 1989 – January 1993.  See WHITE HOUSE, 
Biography of Vice President Richard B. Cheney, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
vicepresident/vpbio.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).  He was then the Chief Executive 
Officer of Halliburton from 1995 – August 2000.  See Halliburton, Dick Cheney Resumes 
Role as Chairman of Halliburton Company, Feb. 1, 2000, at http://www.halliburton.com/ 
news/archive/2000/corpnws_020100.jsp.  In August 2000, he became Mr. Bush’s vice-
presidential running mate.  See HALLIBURTON, Halliburton Announces Second Quarter 
Earnings of 17 Cents Per Share, July 26, 2000, at http://www.halliburton.com/news/ 
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archive/2000/corpnws_072600.jsp.  And of course, Cheney has been Vice-President since 
2001.  Keeping that timeline in mind, let us turn to Halliburton.  In the aftermath of 
Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait in 1991, Halliburton was awarded contracts to help 
bring burning oil wells under control.  In addition, Brown & Root Services (a Halliburton 
business unit) assessed and repaired damaged public buildings in Kuwait.  Then, the U.S. 
Army awarded Halliburton a major contract for worldwide logistics support planning—
the first such U.S. military contract with a civilian group.  Halliburton was awarded 
similar contracts by the Navy.  There are innumerable other examples of U.S. military 
and other government contracts with Halliburton and its affiliates.  See HALLIBURTON, 
Achievements & Landmarks, at http://www.halliburton.com/about/history_achiev.jsp 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2003).  Recently, Halliburton and Cheney have been centers of 
inquiry into allegations about the manufacturing of an energy crisis in California.  Just 
recently, Halliburton has received government contracts with respect to a post-invasion 
Iraq.  US Firms Vie to Rebuild Iraq, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 10, 2003, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2837477.stm; Danny Penman, U.S. Firms Set for 
Post-War Contracts, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,911943,00.html. 
It is not just Halliburton, of course, that is poised to benefit from a post-conflict Iraq.  
After we gave this lecture, news agencies reported that the U.S. government invited five 
companies to compete for rebuilding projects in Iraq after a war “in what would be the 
biggest rebuilding project since World War II.”  US Awards Deals For Post-War Iraq, 
BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2837657.stm.  As 
Penman writes: “It’s a sensitive topic because we still haven’t gone to war,” one industry 
executive told the Wall Street Journal. “But these companies are really in a position to 
win something out of this geopolitical situation.” Penman, supra. 
Apparently members of congress are not happy with the Administration’s secretiveness 
about plans for a post-war Iraq.  Senators Bash Pentagon for Postwar Iraq Secrecy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003 (on file with Seattle Journal for Social Justice).  Also troubling is 
the fact that the U.S. has decided that it will only award these contracts to U.S. 
companies.  BBC NEWS, US Firms Vie to Rebuild Ira, supra.  While it is surely true that 
somebody needs to repair the planned damage, and that the “coalition of the willing” is 
diminished, the unilateral benefit to U.S. companies belies the purity of the 
Administration’s justifications for the war. 
26 For the original statement and the apology, see DEPT. OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE STATEMENT ON THE DRAFT, Jan. 21, 2003, at http://www.dod.mil/news/ 
Jan2003/b01212003_bt029-03.htm.  An eminent military historian has explained the 
negative tendency since World War II to treat military service largely as an economic 
problem.  ELIOT A. COHEN, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS: THE DILEMMAS OF MILITARY 
SERVICE 20 (1985). 
27 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 23. 
28 Id. at 18. 
29 Id. at 17. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 18-9. 
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32 Which is connected to security and terrorism, thus: “Poverty does not make poor 
people into terrorists and murderers.  Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can 
made weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.” 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at v.  See also, NATIONAL STRATEGY 
FOR COMBATING TERRORISM (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf: 
These efforts to diminish underlying conditions have material as well as 
intangible dimensions.  Ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, 
foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, 
good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on 
combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying 
conditions that terrorists often seek to manipulate for their own advantage. 
Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
33 Id. 
34 That is, one would need to take into account, as President Bush Sr. did in a speech at 
Tufts University after the date of this lecture, that there is “[A] small fringe element that 
frankly exist [sic] in every society...”  2003 Issam M. Fares Lecture—Former President 
George H.W. Bush, TUFTS E-NEWS, Feb. 26, 2003, at http://enews.tufts.edu/stories/ 
030303BushSpeech.htm. 
35 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at iv. 
36 Professor Michael Ignatieff has recently described this cherry-picking approach to 
legal obligation as an aspect of empire: 
Being an imperial power, however, is more than being the most powerful 
nation or just the most hated one.  It means enforcing such order as there is in 
the world and doing so in the American interest.  It means laying down the 
rules America wants (on everything from markets to weapons of mass 
destruction) while exempting itself from the other rules (the Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change and the International Criminal Court) that go against its 
interest. 
Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 6 (Magazine) at 22. 
37 It may not be surprising that even though NAFTA was not ratified by two-thirds of the 
Senate as required for treaties under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the 
constitutionality of the NAFTA treaty has been held to be a political question 
inappropriate for judicial review.  Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 
F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001). 
38 Such as anti-discrimination laws or environmental protection laws. 
39  Article 2018 of NAFTA provides that when a government is not in conformity 
with NAFTA provisions, the government must either agree not to implement 
the offending measure (typically a federal law) or agree to remove the 
offending measure.  If the government continues to be in noncompliance, 
appropriate compensation must be offered or the aggrieved party may suspend 
benefits until a settlement is reached.   
Chantell Taylor, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous 
Double Standard for Workers’ Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 401, 413 (2000).  
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Presumably all human rights and anti-discrimination laws are trade restrictive, and we 
can expect their further erosion under the present regime. 
40 “Under Article 1116, a claim may be submitted to arbitration if an investor believes 
that a government has breached an obligation under the NAFTA and that the breach 
caused the investor to incur a loss or damage as a result.”  Id. at 412. 
41 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 19. 
42 They do not have to, of course, since corporations and investors can enforce NAFTA. 
43 Methlcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl. 
44 This example is taken from Taylor, supra note 39, at 413-415.  Taylor points out that 
this is not the only case where a corporation has attempted to use NAFTA as a tool to 
evade liability in local courts, relying on the government essentially to indemnify them.  
In another case, a Canadian-based conglomerate, Loewen Group, was the defendant in a 
Mississippi lawsuit and found liable for fraud and gross business misconduct for its 
aggressive attempts to ruin a small local funeral home and insurance operator.  The jury 
awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $100 million (compensatory) and $400 
million (punitive).   
Rather than appeal, Loewen settled the case for $150 million.  Now, Loewen 
has filed a claim for $725 million against the U.S. government under 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, claiming that the jury verdict, the punitive damages, 
and the appeal bond requirement ‘violated international legal norms of 
‘fairness,’ discriminated against the Canadian-based corporation and attempted 
to ‘expropriate’ or seize Loewen’s assets …’ in derogation of NAFTA 
guarantees.  
Id. at 414. 
45 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination in employment, but 
provides as a defense that sex, i.e. being a man or a woman, could be a “bona fide 
occupational qualification,” (BFOQ) “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).  When a “facially 
neutral” employment policy disproportionately effects a protected class, it is a defense 
that the policy is justified by “business necessity.”  The business necessity defense was 
judicially created, but found statutory footing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B).  By virtue of this system, Hooters is legally permitted to hire 
only women as servers (to be “Hooters Girls”), to demand that they have large breasts, 
and to require employees to sign an acknowledgment that they will not find the 
environment “offensive, hostile or unwelcome.”  See Joseph M. Kelly & Adele Sinclair, 
Sexual Harassment of Employees by Customers and Other Third Parties: American and 
British Views, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 807, 824-825 (2000); see also Hooters of America, 
Inc., Hooters.com: About Hooters, at http://www.hootersofamerica.com/company/ 
about_hooters (last visited Apr. 10, 2003). 
46 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American 
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
47 Without appropriate tort remedies, of course, corporations suffer no significant penalty 
when they choose to enhance their own profits by endangering the consuming public.  
The whole point of punitive damages, for example, was because actual damages would 
not be sufficient to punish or deter reprehensible conduct—that is, conduct constituting 
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an abuse of power or trust, or maliciously motivated.  Capping punitive damages is 
unlikely to deter abuses of power, and arbitrarily caps limit the remedy’s efficiency.  Id. 
at 54-72. 
48 Consider the immunities for pharmaceutical companies stuck into the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1714-17, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified 
as 6 U.S.C. § 101).  Such special favors created considerable debate, until Republicans 
agreed that they would cooperate in removing those provisions later.  The amendments 
are pending in the 2003 budget bill.  See Conference Report on H.J. Res. 2, Consolidated 
Appropriations Resolution, 2003, 149 Cong. Rec. H707-01 (2003) (statement of Rep. 
Young); and see, e.g., H.R. 484, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 41 108th Cong. (2003); and S. 105 
108th Cong. (2003).  Consider also the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-104, § 501, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230) (internet Services 
Providers are insulated from a broad range of torts, including federal immunity from any 
cause of action that would make them liable for information originating with a third party 
user of the service, regardless of the service providers state of mind/knowledge); the 
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-230, § 1, 112 Stat. 1519 
(1998) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 1601) (companies that supply raw materials such as 
silicone or components for medical implants given federal immunity); Rustad & Koenig, 
supra note 46, at 97-98; and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 801, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1997) (“Places limits on the 
rights of prisoners to recover for a variety of lawsuits including the unprotected exposure 
to asbestos hazards”). Rustad & Koenig, supra note 46, at 71. 
49 After our lecture, the BBC reported that: “Tumbling insurance shares have been a 
feature of falling stock markets.  As prices fall, these companies’ large equity holdings 
reduce in value, and they are forced to make further sales so they have sufficient cash 
reserves.”  Of course, damages caps and litigation roadblocks that make it difficult for 
victims to make claims are just another way of cutting insurance costs to make up for 
these losses.  BBC NEWS, UK Shares Hit New Low, Mar. 11, 2003, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2837711.stm. 
50 “President Bush is making a renewed push for strict limits on jury awards he blames 
for skyrocketing premiums.”  Richard Oppel Jr., Bush Enters Fray Over Malpractice, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24. 
51 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 46, at 51. 
52 See generally JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: HOW 
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGE AMERICA’S SOCIAL 
AGENDA (1996). 
53 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 46, at 74–76. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 54. 
56 The New York Times reports that 39% of Americans believe that they are or will be in 
the richest 1% of the population.  David Brooks, The Triumph of Hope Over Self-Interest, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 4 at 15.  Perhaps executives will continue to walk away 
with their gigantic profits and we are going to let them because we think it could be us. 
57 The Secretary of the Army is Thomas E. White.  See Matt Bivens, Enron: Under 
Cover of Dark and the War, DAILY TIMES PAK., Feb. 23, 2003, at 
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http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-2-2003_pg4_11; Jason 
Leopold, Tom White Played Key Role In Covering Up Enron Losses, SCOOP, Oct. 8, 
2002, at http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0210/S00052.htm; and Army 
Secretary’s Enron Role Probed, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2002, at A18, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A25816-2002Feb17.  See also U.S. ARMY, 
Official Biography of Thomas E. White, at www.army.mil/leaders/Secarmy/bio.htm (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2003): 
Secretary White has statutory responsibility for all matters relating to Army 
manpower, personnel, reserve affairs, installations, environmental issues, 
weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and financial 
management.  Secretary White is responsible for the department’s annual 
budget of nearly $82 billion. 
Id.  After we gave this presentation, Secretary White was fired by Mr. Rumsfeld.  See 
Rumsfeld Set to Change Army Leadership, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 2003, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Army  
58 Doe v. Bush, No. 03-1266, 2003 U.S. App. WL 1093975, at *1 (1st Cir. Mar. 12, 
2003), petition denied, No. 03-1266, 2003 U.S. App. WL 1221158 (1st Cir. Mar. 18, 
2003), available at http://www.mfso.org/. 
59 We do not think that judicial review is “the answer” by any means, but is only one of 
many tools that can have positive political consequences.  For a wonderful account of 
usually “losing” efforts to constrain military adventurism by legal means, see Jules Lobel, 
Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1995). 
60 Four Justices—Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, and Brennan—wanted to hear Vietnam 
matters, but they were never willing to do so in the same case, so the four votes required 
to grant certiorari were never put together.  Rodric B. Schoen, Strange Silence: Vietnam 
and the Supreme Court, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 304 (1994). 
61 The only Supreme Court decision nominally addressing the merits was Atlee v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), summarily aff’d, Atlee v. Laird, 339 F.Supp. 1347 
(E.D. Pa. 1972), in which a three-judge district court had dismissed a taxpayer class 
action challenge to the constitutionality of the war as a political question.  A summary 
affirmance, of course, only endorses the lower court result, not the lower court reasoning. 
62 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
63 For an introduction to the technical problems, see Lobel, supra note 59; and see 
Michal R. Belknap, Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren 
Court have Ended the Vietnam War?, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 99 (1999).  Two excellent 
overviews of constitutional national security problems are JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); 
and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990). 
64 In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the state of Georgia had no jurisdiction over Cherokee Nation lands.  Georgia 
openly ignored the decision, and President Jackson took no steps to force compliance.  
According to the story, Jackson said, “John Marshall has made his decision.  Now let him 
enforce it.”  See Joseph Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and 
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525 (1969).  However, the Court had not entered a final 
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order and the President was under no legal obligation.  The private party petitioners did 
not pursue the litigation.  ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 210-212 (6th ed. 1983). 
65 Federal courts are not empowered directly to enjoin the President regarding “non-
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